17.
Litland, Jon Erling
Ground First: Against the Proof Theoretic Definition of Ground Journal Article
In: Synthese, 2024.
@article{Litland2022Ground-First:-A,
title = {Ground First: Against the Proof Theoretic Definition of Ground},
author = {{L}itland, {J}on {E}rling},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/oppo7qj8fna2rgk/against-proof-final.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-29},
journal = {Synthese},
abstract = {This paper evaluates the proof-theoretic definition of ground developed by Poggiolesi in a range of recent publications and argues that her proposed definition fails. The paper then outlines an alternative approach where logical consequence relations and the logical operations are defined in terms of ground.},
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This paper evaluates the proof-theoretic definition of ground developed by Poggiolesi in a range of recent publications and argues that her proposed definition fails. The paper then outlines an alternative approach where logical consequence relations and the logical operations are defined in terms of ground.
16.
Litland, Jon Erling
Logic of Essence Book Chapter
In: Raven, Michael J.; Koslicki, Kathrin (Ed.): Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy, Chapter 16, pp. 240-255, Routledge, 2024.
@inbook{Litland:2021tt,
title = {Logic of Essence},
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editor = {Michael J. Raven and Kathrin Koslicki},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-02-28},
booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy},
pages = {240-255},
publisher = {Routledge},
chapter = {16},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inbook}
}
15.
Litland, Jon Erling
Grounding and Defining Identity Journal Article
In: Nous, vol. 57, pp. 850-876, 2023.
@article{LitlandGrounding-and-D,
title = {Grounding and Defining Identity},
author = {{L}itland, {J}on {E}rling},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/qns92xb9rdlt0u6/grounding-identity.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-01},
urldate = {2023-01-01},
journal = {Nous},
volume = {57},
pages = {850-876},
abstract = {I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinct- ness facts: they are all uniquely zero-grounded. First, the Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework to give a definition of identity, and show how the central features of the identity relation can be deduced from this definition.},
keywords = {},
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I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinct- ness facts: they are all uniquely zero-grounded. First, the Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework to give a definition of identity, and show how the central features of the identity relation can be deduced from this definition.
14.
Litland, Jon Erling
A Note on the Wilhelmine Inconsistency Journal Article
In: Analysis, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 639-647, 2022.
@article{Litland:2021vq,
title = {A Note on the Wilhelmine Inconsistency},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/lv0b3bje378qxxg/wilhelmine-inconsistency.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Analysis},
volume = {81},
number = {4},
pages = {639-647},
abstract = {Wilhelm has recently shown that widely accepted principles about
immediate ground are inconsistent with some principles of
propositional identity. This note responds to this inconsistency by
developing two ground-theoretic accounts of
propositional individuation. On one account some of the grounding
principles are incorrect; on the other account, the principles of propositional
individuation are incorrect.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
Wilhelm has recently shown that widely accepted principles about
immediate ground are inconsistent with some principles of
propositional identity. This note responds to this inconsistency by
developing two ground-theoretic accounts of
propositional individuation. On one account some of the grounding
principles are incorrect; on the other account, the principles of propositional
individuation are incorrect.
immediate ground are inconsistent with some principles of
propositional identity. This note responds to this inconsistency by
developing two ground-theoretic accounts of
propositional individuation. On one account some of the grounding
principles are incorrect; on the other account, the principles of propositional
individuation are incorrect.
13.
Litland, Jon Erling
Collective Abstraction Journal Article
In: Philosophical Review, vol. 131, no. 4, pp. 453-497, 2022.
@article{Litland:CollectiveAbstraction,
title = {Collective Abstraction},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/iykgyy6azepz0tz/Collective%20Abstraction.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-01},
urldate = {2022-01-01},
journal = {Philosophical Review},
volume = {131},
number = {4},
pages = {453-497},
abstract = {This paper develops a novel theory of abstraction---what we call collective abstraction. The theory solves a notorious problem for non-eliminative structuralism. The non-eliminative structuralist holds that in addition to various isomorphic systems there is a pure structure that can be abstracted from each of these systems; but existing accounts of abstraction fail for non- rigid systems like the complex numbers. The problem with the existing accounts is that they attempt to define a unique abstraction operation. The theory of collective abstraction instead simultaneously defines a collection of distinct abstraction operations, each of which maps a system to its corresponding pure structure. The theory is precisely formulated in an essentialist language. This allows us to throw new light on the question to what extent structuralists are committed to symmetric dependence. Finally, we apply the theory of collective abstraction to solve a problem about converse relations.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
This paper develops a novel theory of abstraction---what we call collective abstraction. The theory solves a notorious problem for non-eliminative structuralism. The non-eliminative structuralist holds that in addition to various isomorphic systems there is a pure structure that can be abstracted from each of these systems; but existing accounts of abstraction fail for non- rigid systems like the complex numbers. The problem with the existing accounts is that they attempt to define a unique abstraction operation. The theory of collective abstraction instead simultaneously defines a collection of distinct abstraction operations, each of which maps a system to its corresponding pure structure. The theory is precisely formulated in an essentialist language. This allows us to throw new light on the question to what extent structuralists are committed to symmetric dependence. Finally, we apply the theory of collective abstraction to solve a problem about converse relations.
12.
Litland, Jon Erling
Prospects for a Theory of Decycling Journal Article
In: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 411-435, 2020.
@article{Litland2020Prospects-for-a,
title = {Prospects for a Theory of Decycling},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/w4gkbwrvaofv37o/Prospects%20for%20a%20Theory%20of%20Decycling.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
journal = {Notre Dame J. Formal Logic},
volume = {61},
number = {3},
pages = {411-435},
abstract = {Seemingly natural principles about the logic of ground generate cycles of ground; how can this be if ground is asymmetric? The goal of the theory of decycling is to find systematic and principled ways of getting rid of such cycles of ground. In this paper---drawing on graph-theoretic and topological ideas---I develop a general framework in which various theories of decycling can be compared. This allows us to improve on proposals made earlier by Fine and Litland. However, it turns out that there is no unique method of decycling. An important upshot is that the notion of asymmetric ground may be indeterminate},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
Seemingly natural principles about the logic of ground generate cycles of ground; how can this be if ground is asymmetric? The goal of the theory of decycling is to find systematic and principled ways of getting rid of such cycles of ground. In this paper---drawing on graph-theoretic and topological ideas---I develop a general framework in which various theories of decycling can be compared. This allows us to improve on proposals made earlier by Fine and Litland. However, it turns out that there is no unique method of decycling. An important upshot is that the notion of asymmetric ground may be indeterminate
11.
Litland, Jon Erling
Meta-Ground Book Section
In: Raven, Michael J. (Ed.): Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding, pp. 133-147, Routledge, 2020.
@incollection{Litland2017Puzzles-of-Grou,
title = {Meta-Ground},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
editor = {Michael J. Raven},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-01-01},
booktitle = {Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding},
pages = {133-147},
publisher = {Routledge},
chapter = {9},
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}
10.
Litland, Jon Erling
In Defense of the (Moderate) Disunity of Grounding Journal Article
In: Thought, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 97-108, 2018.
@article{Litland:2017aa,
title = {In Defense of the (Moderate) Disunity of Grounding},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/ov5ihgzscrqgfo0/defense-of-moderate-pluralism.pdf?dl=0},
doi = {10.1002/tht3.273},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Thought},
volume = {7},
number = {2},
pages = {97-108},
abstract = {Fine (2012) is a pluralist about grounding. He holds that there are three fundamentally distinct notions of grounding: metaphysical, normative, and natural. Berker (2017) argues for monism on the grounds that the pluralist cannot account for certain principles describing how the distinct notions of grounding interact. This paper defends pluralism. By building on work by Fine (2010) and Litland (2015) I show how the pluralist can systematically account for Berker's interaction principles.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Fine (2012) is a pluralist about grounding. He holds that there are three fundamentally distinct notions of grounding: metaphysical, normative, and natural. Berker (2017) argues for monism on the grounds that the pluralist cannot account for certain principles describing how the distinct notions of grounding interact. This paper defends pluralism. By building on work by Fine (2010) and Litland (2015) I show how the pluralist can systematically account for Berker's interaction principles.
9.
Litland, Jon Erling
Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground Journal Article
In: Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 411-435, 2018.
@article{Litland2017Pure-Logic-of-I,
title = {Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/uo9fquto2e9wnie/rsl-submission2.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
journal = {Review of Symbolic Logic},
volume = {11},
number = {3},
pages = {411-435},
abstract = {This article develops the Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground (PLIFG), a logic of ground that can deal with claims of the form ``φ grounds that (ψ grounds θ)''---what we call iterated grounding claims. The core idea is that some truths ground a truth φ when there is an explanatory argument (of a certain sort) from premisses to conclusion φ. By developing a deductive system that distinguishes between explanatory and nonexplanatory arguments we can give introduction rules for operators for factive and nonfactive full ground, as well as for a propositional ``identity'' connective. Elimination rules are then found by using a proof-theoretic inversion principle.},
keywords = {},
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tppubtype = {article}
}
This article develops the Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground (PLIFG), a logic of ground that can deal with claims of the form ``φ grounds that (ψ grounds θ)''---what we call iterated grounding claims. The core idea is that some truths ground a truth φ when there is an explanatory argument (of a certain sort) from premisses to conclusion φ. By developing a deductive system that distinguishes between explanatory and nonexplanatory arguments we can give introduction rules for operators for factive and nonfactive full ground, as well as for a propositional ``identity'' connective. Elimination rules are then found by using a proof-theoretic inversion principle.
8.
Litland, Jon Erling
Bicollective Ground: Towards a (Hyper)graphic Account Book Section
In: Bliss, Ricki; Priest, Graham (Ed.): Reality and Its Structure, pp. 140–164, Oxford University Press, 2018.
@incollection{Litland2016Bicollective-Gr,
title = {Bicollective Ground: Towards a (Hyper)graphic Account},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
editor = {Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/2tk9cduql0vyhok/bliss-paper2.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-01},
booktitle = {Reality and Its Structure},
pages = {140--164},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
chapter = {7},
abstract = {Grounding is bicollective if it is possible for some truths δ,δ,... to be grounded in the some truths γ,γ,... without its being the case that each δi is grounded in some subcollection of γ,γ,.... In this paper I show how to do develop a hypergraph-theoretic account of bicollective ground, taking the notion of immediate ground as basic. I also indicate how bicollective ground helps with formulating mathematical structuralism.},
keywords = {},
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tppubtype = {incollection}
}
Grounding is bicollective if it is possible for some truths δ,δ,... to be grounded in the some truths γ,γ,... without its being the case that each δi is grounded in some subcollection of γ,γ,.... In this paper I show how to do develop a hypergraph-theoretic account of bicollective ground, taking the notion of immediate ground as basic. I also indicate how bicollective ground helps with formulating mathematical structuralism.
7.
Litland, Jon Erling
Could the Grounds's Grounding the Grounded Ground the Grounded? Journal Article
In: Analysis, vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 56–65, 2017.
@article{Litland2017Could-the-Groun,
title = {Could the Grounds's Grounding the Grounded Ground the Grounded?},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/6x3xkqpr00di1i7/Could%20the%20Grounds%27s%20Grounding%20the%20Grounded%20Ground.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
journal = {Analysis},
volume = {78},
number = {1},
pages = {56--65},
abstract = {Could φ's partially grounding ψ itself be a partial ground for ψ? I show that it follows from commonly accepted principles in the logic of ground that this sometimes happens. It also follows from commonly accepted principles that this never happens. I show that this inconsistency turns on different principles than the puzzles of ground already discussed in the literature, and I propose a way of resolving the inconsistency.},
keywords = {},
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}
Could φ's partially grounding ψ itself be a partial ground for ψ? I show that it follows from commonly accepted principles in the logic of ground that this sometimes happens. It also follows from commonly accepted principles that this never happens. I show that this inconsistency turns on different principles than the puzzles of ground already discussed in the literature, and I propose a way of resolving the inconsistency.
6.
Litland, Jon Erling
Grounding Ground Journal Article
In: Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 10, pp. 279–316, 2017.
@article{Litland2011GroundingGrounding,
title = {Grounding Ground},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/a31yzwc271vdfzh/grounding-grounding.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
journal = {Oxford Studies in Metaphysics},
volume = {10},
pages = {279--316},
abstract = {The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper develops a novel solution to this problem. The basic idea is to connect ground to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments we can equip operators for factive and non-factive ground with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the resulting logic: non- factive grounding claims, if true, are zero-grounded in the sense of Fine.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper develops a novel solution to this problem. The basic idea is to connect ground to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments we can equip operators for factive and non-factive ground with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the resulting logic: non- factive grounding claims, if true, are zero-grounded in the sense of Fine.
5.
Litland, Jon Erling; Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani
Vagueness & Modality---An Ecumenical Approach Journal Article
In: Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 229–269, 2016.
@article{Litland2016Vagueness-and-M,
title = {Vagueness & Modality---An Ecumenical Approach},
author = {Jon Erling Litland and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/2updpro6b2t0azb/Vagueness%20and%20Modality.pdf?dl=0},
doi = {10.1111/phpe.12088},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
volume = {30},
number = {1},
pages = {229--269},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
4.
Litland, Jon Erling
An infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound url
2016.
@url{litlandinfinitely,
title = {An infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/z0ba4bjsfe2hpjg/An%20infinitely%20descending%20chain%20of%20ground%20without1.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
volume = {173},
number = {5},
pages = {1361--1369},
publisher = {Springer},
abstract = {Using only uncontentious principles from the logic of ground I construct an infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound. I then compare the construction to the constructions due to Dixon (forthcoming) and Rabin and Rabern ().},
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}
Using only uncontentious principles from the logic of ground I construct an infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound. I then compare the construction to the constructions due to Dixon (forthcoming) and Rabin and Rabern ().
3.
Litland, Jon Erling
Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground Journal Article
In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 531-577, 2016.
@article{Litland2013PureLogicsof,
title = {Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/u2y5ft27ynqfbos/pure-logic-jpl.pdf?dl=0},
doi = {10.1007/s10992-015-9386-2},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-01-01},
journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},
volume = {45},
number = {5},
pages = {531-577},
abstract = {A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a ``many-many'' logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta [10]. In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine's State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground (PLG) can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground (PLMMG). In the second, more technical, part of the paper, I do two things. First, I present an alternative formalization of PLG; this allows us to simplify Fine's completeness proof for PLG. Second, I formalize PLMMG using an infinitary sequent calculus and prove that this formalization is sound and complete.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a ``many-many'' logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta [10]. In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine's State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground (PLG) can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic of Many-Many Ground (PLMMG). In the second, more technical, part of the paper, I do two things. First, I present an alternative formalization of PLG; this allows us to simplify Fine's completeness proof for PLG. Second, I formalize PLMMG using an infinitary sequent calculus and prove that this formalization is sound and complete.
2.
Litland, Jon Erling
Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality Journal Article
In: Philosophical Review, vol. 124, no. 4, pp. 481-533, 2015.
@article{Litland2013Groundingisnot,
title = {Grounding, Explanation, and the Limit of Internality},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/6yddov5h9ii32eu/Grounding%2C%20Explanation%2C%20and%20the%20Limit%20of%20Internality.pdf?dl=0},
doi = {10.1215/00318108-3147011},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-01},
journal = {Philosophical Review},
volume = {124},
number = {4},
pages = {481-533},
abstract = {Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a ``completely satisfactory explanation'' to shed light on the logic of ground in the presence of self-reference. This allows us to develop a satisfactory logic of ground and recover a sense in which grounding is still an internal relation.},
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Most authors on metaphysical grounding have taken full grounding to be an internal relation in the sense that it's necessary that if the grounds and the grounded both obtain, then the grounds ground the grounded. The negative part of this essay exploits empirical and provably nonparadoxical self-reference to prove conclusively that even immediate full grounding isn't an internal relation in this sense. The positive, second part of this essay uses the notion of a ``completely satisfactory explanation'' to shed light on the logic of ground in the presence of self-reference. This allows us to develop a satisfactory logic of ground and recover a sense in which grounding is still an internal relation.
1.
Litland, Jon Erling
On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding Journal Article
In: Essays in Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 19–32, 2013.
@article{Litland2013SomeCounterexamplesto,
title = {On Some Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Grounding},
author = {Jon Erling Litland},
editor = {Paul Hovda and Troy Cross},
url = {https://www.dropbox.com/s/a9nul5o1djc4zsk/counterexamples%20to%20transitivity.pdf?dl=0},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
issuetitle = {Grounding Relation(s)},
journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {19--32},
abstract = {I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don't work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don't work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.